Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1981

Federal Jurisdiction -- A Lamentable Situation
J. M. Evans
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Source Publication:
Canadian Bar Review. Volume 59, Number 1 (1981), p. 124-153.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Evans, J. M. "Federal Jurisdiction -- A Lamentable Situation." Canadian Bar Review 59.1 (1981): 124-153.

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of
Osgoode Digital Commons.

Comments on Legislation and Judicial Decisions
Chronique de législation et de jurisprucence

FEDERAL JURISDICTION-A LAMENTABLE SITUATION .-It was entirely predictable that the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Quebec North Shore Paper Co . v . Canadian Pacific Ltd' and in
McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd v . The Queen' would
severely jeopardise the effective exercise of many aspects of the
original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada . 3 Since those
cases were decided, six other cases have been decided by the
Supreme Court on the constitutional limits of the jurisdiction of the
Federal Court, and in more than fifty judgments rendered by both
divisions of the Federal Court, the effect of the two principal
decisions of the Supreme Court has had to be considered . Both the
proliferation of litigation over such preliminary matters of comparatively little intrinsic importance, and the serious injustices perpetrated by the results of many of these cases, require, as a matter of
urgency, remedial legislative action . This comment attempts an
analysis of the burgeoning case law on the constitutional reach
permitted to federal jurisdiction, and considers some possible
methods of defusing many of the constitutional land-mines which the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the British North America Act 4
has placed around much of the original jurisdiction of the Federal
Court .
It will be recalled that in Quebec North Shore and McNamara
the Supreme Court held that Parliament's constitutional authority to
establish further courts "for the better administration of the laws of
1 [197712 S .C .R . 1054 .

2 [197712 S .C .R . 654.
3 For a comment that was highly critical of these cases, see P .W . Hogg (1977),
55 Can. Bar Rev. 550. Nor have cries of lament been confined to contributors to the
learned journals ; see, for example, the comments by Collier J. in Pacific Western:
Airlines Ltd v. The Queen, [1979] 2 F.C . 476, at p. 490 (T .D .) .
4 1867, 30 & 31 Vict ., c . 3, as am . (U .K .) .
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Canada' 14a only enables it to confer jurisdiction upon the Federal
Court to entertain claims that are "founded on some existing federal
law" .S,A law that has not been enacted by Parliament is not "a law
of Canada" merely because its repeal or amendment is within the
exclusive legislative competence of Parliament . Nor is the constitutional requirement of "a law of Canada" necessarily satisfied by
those provisions in the Federal Court Acts which confer jurisdiction
upon the Federal Court to decide cases involving designated
subject-matter or specified parties . The Federal Court may only
assume jurisdiction over a case if an affirmative answer is given to
each of the following three questions . First, does the Federal Court
Act, as a matter of statutory interpretation, confer jurisdiction over
the dispute? Secondly, if it does, is the plaintiff's claim founded on
existing federal law? Thirdly, does Parliament have the constitutional authority to enact the substantive law in question? In other
words, both the conferral of jurisdiction, and the substantive law
upon which the court's jurisdiction can operate must depend upon
some valid federal law. The thrust of Quebec North Shore and
McNamara Construction was to deny, in general terms, the existence
of a body of federal common law that was co-extensive with the
unexercised constitutional legislative competence of Parliament over
matters assigned to it. s a Thus a law will normally only be a law of
Canada for the purpose of section 101 of the British North America
Act if it is enacted by or under federal legislation. Nonetheless, at
least one exception to this restrictive definition of a law of Canada
has been recognised . This is that the legal liability of the Crown in
right of Canada always depends upon a law of Canada, even when it
is not clearly based upon some federal statute, such as the Crown
Liability Act .7
4a

Ibid., s . 101 .

5 Per Laskin C.J .C . in McNamara's case, supra, footnote 2, at'p . 659.
s R.S .C ., 1970 (2nd Supp .) ; c. 10 .

ea
But it would now appear from the'recent decisions of the Supreme Court in
Rhine and Prytula, infra, footnotes 34a and 43, that despite the contractual nature of
the relationship between the parties, a plaintiff's rights may be founded upon federal
law provided that federal legislation has a sufficient "impact" upon them .

° R.S .C ., 1970, c. C-38 . One other possible exception may also be noted.
Somewhat surprisingly there is authority for the proposition that the British North
America Act, 1867 may itself be a law of Canada which the Federal Court has
jurisdiction to administer . The question was most explicitly considered in The Queen
in the right of Canada v. The Queen in the right of the Province of Prince Edward
Island, [1978] 1 F.C . 533 (C .A .) in which P.E .I . claimed damages from the federal
Crown for failing to perform its duties to provide a ferry service between the island
and the mainland . The duty was contained in the terms under which P.E .I . was
admitted to Confederation, an order in council made pursuant to s. 146 of the British
North America Act, 1867 . The case came before the Federal Court by virtue of its
jurisdiction over intergovernmental disputes (s . 19) .
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The judgments in these cases left considerable room for
argument about their precise scope . What was to be included in the
term "federal law" was not totally clear, nor was the requirement
that claims be "founded" on such a law . One context in which it was
apparent that very serious difficulties might be encountered was in
connection with suits involving multiple parties, only some of whose
rights or liabilities fell within the constitutional limits of federal
jurisdiction . This question has been the subject of a recent decision
by the Supreme Court of Canada . The court's answer poses serious
practical problems for litigants, proceeds upon some highly questionable constitutional reasoning and may so undermine the efficacy
of much of the admittedly valid original jurisdiction of the Federal
Court that there is little alternative left to Parliament except to return
jurisdiction to the courts in the provinces .
This comment begins by considering the particular problems
inherent in litigation involving multiple parties, some of whom may
be sued only in the Federal Court, and then examines some of the
wider implications of recent decisions for the future of federal
jurisdiction .
Federal jurisdiction and multiple parties
One question which has already arisen in a number of cases is
whether the Federal Court can be empowered to determine the rights
and duties of a party, which would otherwise fall outside federal

The parties appeared content to accept that the Federal Court had jurisdiction,
and Jackett C .J . concluded that it was not apparent on the face of the proceedings that
the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction . He thought (at pp . 561-562) that the fact that
the duty in question was not imposed by provincial law distinguished the case from
McNamara . Moreover, he also thought it possible that s . 19 of the Federal Court Act
both conferred jurisdiction and authorized the court to apply substantive federal law .
Perhaps the easiest answer, though, was that the liability of the federal Crown is
always a question of federal law . See infra, footnote 26 .
The constitution is a law of Canada in the sense that it is the ultimate criterion of
the rule of recognition by which the validity of both federal and provincial laws is
determined . But it is clearly of a superior order to the federal laws which it authorizes
Parliament to enact . It would, however, be odd to say that the Federal Court's
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a federal statute was contingent upon
its holding it to be valid . See Denison Mines Ltd v. Att.-Gen. of Canada, [1973] 1
O .R . 797 (H .C .), where Donnelly J . held that the Federal Court Act removed the
jurisdiction of provincial superior courts to determine the validity of a federal statute
in a proceeding which otherwise fell within one of the heads of the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Court . It would also be inconvenient to require a party who
wished to challenge a federal board's decision on the ground that it had acted ultra
vires the statute or, alternatively, that the enabling legislation was invalid, to pursue
these grounds in different courts . Contrast Lain Society of B .C . v. Att.-Gen. ofCanada
(1980), 108 D .L .R . (3d) 753 (B .C .C .A .) .
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jurisdiction, by virtue, of the fact that the right pr. liability in question
arises out of an incident from which proceedings have properly been
instituted in the Federal Court. For instance, in Pacific Western
Airlines Ltd v . The Queen, 8 the owners and operators of an aircraft
that had crashed at an airport in Cranbrook, British Columbia,
sought to join as defendants to the action, the federal Crown, certain
named Crown servants, the City of Cranbrook as the owner of the
airport and the employer of-other defendants whose negligence the
plaintiffs alleged had contributed . to the accident, the manufacturers
of the aircraft and the suppliers of allegedly defective aircraft
equipment. 1t was held that the Federal Court's jurisdiction was
confined to claims founded on existing federal law and that only the
claim against the Crown satisfied this test.9 The court's jurisdiction
was no greater in a case in which there were multiple defendants .than
it would have been had separate proceedings been instituted against
each defendant . By virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred
upon the Federal Court over suits brought against the federal
Crown, 1 ° legal proceedings would have to be instituted in more than
one court . Some of the alarming implications of this result did not go
unnoticed in the Trial Division by Collier J . : 11

Multiplication of proceedings raises the spectre of different results in different
courts . The plaintiffs then face the question, in respect of the defendants, other
than the Crown: the court of which province, or perhaps more than one
province? . . . There may well be other jurisdictional questions. I do not know
the, solution to any of them .
The situation is lamentable . There are probably many other persons who have
claims arising out of this air disaster . The jurisdictional perils must be, to all
those potential litigants, mystifying and frightening .

Despite the obvious potential hardships involved in this strict
approach to the interpretation of British North America Act, 1867,

'Supra, footnote 3; aff'd, [19801 1 F.C . 86 (C .A .) .
9 The plaintiffs' contention that a cause of action in their favour arose out of
breaches of certain provisions of the federal Aeronautics Act and the regulations
made thereunder was rejected . Their argument, based on an analogy with maritime
law, that there was a body of federal law called "aviation law" was also dismissed.
11 Federal Court Act,
supra, footnote 6, s. 17(1).
x' Supra; footnote 3, at p. 490. Considerations of this kind prompted the

Supreme Court of Canada in "The Sparrows Point" v. Greater Vancouver Water
District, [19511 S.C .R . 396, to interpret the statutory jurisdiction of the Exchequer
Court over claims for "damage done by any ship" in a generous manner by allowing
the plaintiff to join the National Harbours Board as a joint tortfeasor with the ship .
Contrast, though, Bow, MacLachlan & Co . Ltd v. "The Camosun", [19091 A.C .
597 (admiralty jurisdiction of the Exchequer Court did not extend to a claim made by
the defendant against a third party over which the court would have had no
jurisdiction if it had been asserted by an independent claim) .
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section 101, 12 there can now be no doubt that it is the law ." This has
been made abundantly clear by the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in The Queen v . Thomas Fuller Construction Co .
(1958) Ltd ." The plaintiff, Foundation, had brought an action in the
Federal Court against the Crown in which it alleged that the Crown
was in breach of a building contract and that it was liable in
negligence for damage sustained by the plaintiff as a result of
blasting operations carried out by another contractor, Fuller . The
Crown then served a third party notice upon Fuller, in which the
Crown claimed a contractual indemnity from Fuller for any damages
for which it might be held liable to the plaintiff, or, in the
alternative, for contribution or indemnity under the terms of the
1Vegligence Act 15 of Ontario . The plaintiff had not joined Fuller as a
co-defendant . The Crown's third party notice was struck out on the
ground that it was not founded on federal law and was therefore
outside the jurisdiction that could constitutionally be exercised by
the Federal Court .
It will be recalled that the Supreme Court had held in
McNamara" that in the absence of existing, substantive federal law,
Parliament could not confer jurisdiction upon the Federal Court to
entertain actions brought by the Crown . The federal Crown's right to
sue in tort or upon a contract is founded on the applicable provincial
law, albeit that Parliament may have unexercised legislative
authority to amend the law applicable to the rights of the Crown.
Since the adjudication of the rights asserted by the Crown in the main
action in McNamara did not fall within federal jurisdiction, it
followed afortiori that any claim over for indemnity in respect of the
1z
For a poignant example of the problems, see Attorney-General of Canada v .
DeLaurier (1978), 93 D .L .R . (3d) 434 (Man. Q .B .), where the Crown's action was
held out of time by the Manitoba court in which it was ultimately brought, after the
decision in McNamara had made it clear that the proceedings already pending before
the Federal Court had been instituted in the wrong forum .
13 Earlier authorities supporting this position include Anglophoto Ltd v . "The
Ikaros", [1973] F.C . 483 (T .D .) ; Desbiens v . The Queen, [197412 F .C. 20 (T .D .) ;
McGregor v . The Queen, [1977] 2 F .C . 520 (T .D .) ; Alda Enterprises Ltd v . The
Queen, [1978] 2 F .C . 106 (T .D .) ; Attridge v . The Queen (1978), 86 D .L .R . (3d) 543
(Fed . Ct T .D .) ; Tomossy v . Hammond, [1979] 2 F .C . 232 ; Nichols v . The Queen
(an unreported judgment of the Trial Division rendered on Sept . 28th, 1979 ; No .
T-3094-79) ; Dolan v . The Queen (an unreported judgment of the Trial Division
rendered on April 29th, 1979 ; No . T-1180-79) .
14 (1979) . 106 D .L .R . (3d) 193 : the decision affirmed the judgment of the
Federal Court of Appeal, [1979] 1 F .C . 877) . See John B . Laskin and Robert J .
Sharpe, Constricting Federal Court Jurisdiction : A Comment on Fuller Construction
(1980), 30 U .T .L.J . 283, for an able discussion of many of the issues raised in this
article .
1s R.S .O
., 1970. c . 296, s . 2(1) .
16 Supra, footnote 2 .
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loss, in the absence of . any relevant federal law, must also fail .
However, in obiter dicta, couched somewhat obliquely in tentative
and narrow terms, Laskin C.J.C . stated :"

I would, however, observe, that if there had been jurisdiction in the Federal
Court there could be some likelihood . of proceedings for the contribution or
indemnity being similarly competent, at least between the parties, in so far as
the supporting federal law embraced the issues arising therein .

Quite apart from the fact the Chief Justice evidently did not intend
these words to embody his final opinion on the matter, they could not
reasonably be interpreted to mean that Parliament could constitutionally confer upon the Federal Court a pendent , or ancillary
jurisdiction to dispose of claims against- other parties, simply
because they arose out of the incident which gave rise to the main
action which was founded on a law of Canada . For one thing, he
appeared to envisage that the parties to the claim over should also
have been parties to the principal action, and for another, that the
claim over itself should be "embraced" by existing federal law. On
the other hand, it might be said that if this were all that the Chief
Justice meant, then it is difficult to understand why it needed to be
mentioned at all as a separate problem to which so tentative a
solution seemed appropriate . A claim that satisfied this latter test
would surely generally be constitutionally sustainable as a cause of
action founded on a law of Canada . What the Chief Justice may have
had in mind is that if a federal statute can be interpreted as
referentially incorporating into federal law some body of provincial
law, then, that will suffice to found federal jurisdiction . 1S
This dictum might have been used to prise open a fissure in the
monolithic face ofMcNamara . It was, nonetheless, hardly surprising
that the Federal Court subsequently disallowed third party claims for
contribution_ and indemnity that arose out of a main action which was
within the Federal Court's jurisdiction ." The judicial sense of
11 Ibid ., at p . 664.
"Cf. Schwella v . The Queen, [19571 Ex . C .R . 226, at p . 230, where, in deciding that the Exchequer Court had jurisdiction over a third party notice served by the
Crown, Thurlow J. said: "Under . [section 3 of the Crown Liability Act, S .C .,
1952-53, c . 30], the law applicable for determining when the Crown is liable in the
case' of tort committed in the Province of Ontario is the law of that province and
includes the provisions of the Negligence Act, which was in force when the Crown
Liability Act came into effect ." However, the authority of this case has now been
undermined because the court identified the term "laws - of Canada" with the scope
of the legislative competence of Parliament . But see now the reasoning in Rhine and
Prytula, footnotes 6a, supra and 34a and 43, infra .
le See, for example, McGregor v . The Queen, [1977] 2 F .C . 520 (T .D .) ;
Western Caissons (Quebec) Ltd v . McNamara Corporation of Newfoundland Co .,
Ltd, [19791 1 F .C . 509 (C .A .) ; see also Lewis Insulations Ltd v . Goodram Bros . Ltd
(1978), 90 D .L .R. (3d) 311 (Ont . H .C .) . Contrast, however, Davie Shipbuilding Ltd
v . The Queen, [1979] 2 F . C . 235, at pp . 240-244 (T . D .) .
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fidelity to the pronouncements of the highest court in the land
prevailed over a recognition that to require such claims to be pursued
elsewhere was calculated to increase parties' costs, and to delay the
final settlement of all the issues arising from the facts upon which the
main action rested . By the time that the question reached the
Supreme Court in the Fuller case, it would be difficult to deny that
the decisions in Quebec North Shore and McNamara had already cast
their shadow over it . However, the reasoning by which the Supreme
Court concluded that the theory upon which those cases rested
inexorably drove it to the unsatisfactory result reached in Fuller,
deserves closer examination .
Apart from the two principal decisions in which the Supreme
Court formulated the constitutional limitations of federal jurisdiction, the only authority upon which the court relied in Fuller's case
was The Bank of Montreal v . The Royal Bank of Canada .'° The issue
in that case was whether the grant of jurisdiction to the Exchequer
Court to determine "actions . . . of a civil nature . . . in which the
Crown is plaintiff' 1,21 extended as a matter of statutory interpretation
to a claim for indemnity by a party against whom the Crown was
proceeding in the principal action . The Supreme Court held that
since "the proceeding against the third party is a substantive
proceeding and not a mere incident of the principal action"," the
claim for indemnity was not encompassed by the suit brought by the
Crown out of which the claim arose . The question in Fuller,
however, did not depend upon the scope of the statutory jurisdiction
of the Federal Court . Quite clearly, the claim made by the Crown fell
within it . 23 The contested issue was whether the Crown's claim was
founded upon federal law for the purpose of determining the
constitutional scope of the court's jurisdiction . Precisely what the
logical connection is between this, and the question decided in The
Bank of Montreal is not easy to see . It can be conceded that if the
claim for contribution in that case had been pursued in separate

The question had already arisen in Consolidated Distilleries Ltd v. Consolidated
Exporters Corporation Ltd, [19301 S .C .R . 531 . In that case the Crown had sued the
defendants in the Exchequer Court on certain bonds. The defendants' third party
notice claiming contractual indemnity was struck out on the ground that their rights
under the contract were not governed by a law of Canada. But see the judgment in
Schwella v. The Queen, [19571 Ex . C .R . 226.
10 [19331 S.C .R . 311 .
21

Exchequer Court Act, R.S .C ., 1927, c. 34, s. 30(d).
22 Ibid., at p. 316. See also the cases on the admiralty jurisdiction of the
Exchequer Court cited in footnote 11, supra.
21
Federal Court Act, supra, footnote 6, s. 17(4)(a), provides that the Trial
Division of the Federal Court has concurrent original jurisdiction "in proceedings of
a civil nature in which the Crown or the Attorney General of Canada claims relief".
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proceedings, it could hardly have been said to be a civil action to
which the Crown was plaintiff . It makes. sense, therefore, to say that
the Crown is still not "the plaintiff" when the claim is asserted by a
third party notice to the principal action . However, even if the
Crown had instituted separate proceedings for contribution in
Fuller, 24 the argument that its claim was founded upon federal law
would still be plausible . For a condition precedent to the Crown's
right to contribution was its liability to the plaintiff in the main
action ,25 a question that is indisputably one of federal law."
Whether the ability of a party to divide the grounds of his claim into
separate proceedings founded respectively upon federal and provincial law should or should not be used as the test of the federal law
basis of a cause of action, the issue is hardly resolved by The Bank of
Montreal case. In any event, in Fuller federal and provincial law
provided an inextricably mixed basis of the right asserted by the
Crown against the third party.
A further point of difference between the The Bank of Montreal
and Fuller is that the former was decided solely on a question o¬
statutory interpretation . Fuller, of course, depended upon the
constitutionality of a legislative provision, the interpretation of
which, if valid, indisputably .conferred the requisite jurisdiction
upon the Federal Court to decide the Crown's claim. It would surely
not have been unreasonable for the Supreme Court to have started its
analysis with the familiar presumption in favour of the validity of
Acts of Parliament, and to have concluded by finding that section
101 of the British North America Act should be interpreted to
include a power to confer jurisdiction upon the Federal Court to
decide those matters that could be fairly said to be necessarily
incidental to the effective exercise of the jurisdiction that Parliament
2'
A course which 'the Ontario courts, by a remarkable interpretation of the
Negligence Act, have consistently denied to claimants for contribution who have
been sued to judgment by the injured party. See Cohen v. S. McCord & Co ., [19441
o. R. 568; Rickwood v. Town ofAylmer (1957), 8 D.L .R. (2d) 702; Paul Papp Ltd v.
Fitzpatrick, [1967110 . R. 565 . In Fuller, supra, footnote 14, however, Pigeon J. (at
p. 205) said of these decisions. "I am not at all sure that the construction of the
statute which gave this unsatisfactory result was correct." For a less radical view,
see Bates v. Illerburn (1976), 70 D.L .R . (3d) 154, at p. 158, where it was suggested
that Cohen v. McCord might not apply when a claimant for contribution against the
federal Crown had been sued by the injured party in an Ontario court. Any other
result would destroy the right to contribution because the federal Crown can only be
sued in the Federal Court .
25
This point was made clearly by Martland J. in dissent (ibid., at p. 198) where
he stated "In order to succeed in its third party claim, the Crown must first establish
its liability to Foundation . That liability involves 'federal law' as is pointed
out . . . in McNamara . . .
ze See-McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd v. The Queen, supra, footnote 2,

at p. 662.
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had quite validly conferred upon it. 27 However, the refusal of the
court to consider the injustice to the litigants of its interpretation of
section 101 could not be made clearer that it was by Pigeon J.
when he stated that even if the Negligence Act precluded the Crown
from instituting separate proceedings for contribution in the Ontario
courts after being held liable in the Federal Court, the remedy was
legislative reform, not constitutional manipulation ."
The Supreme Court's constitutional anlaysis in Fuller started
from a quite different point. Pigeon J . reasoned that one of the
fundamentals of the allocation of judicial power inherent in the
British North America Act was that the superior courts in the
provinces were to exercise general jurisdiction over both federal and
provincial law . The disadvantages of a dual court system were
avoided by a system of federal and provincial co-operation through
the federal appointing power and provincial control over the
administration of justice . Our constitution did not require the
establishment of separate courts to administer provincial and federal
law, although the creation of federal courts was expressly authorised . But since the establishment of such courts was not
necessary (that is constitutionally mandated), how could it be argued
that the inclusion of an ancillary power, of the kind described above,
could be necessary for the exercise of Parliament's legislative
authority?
What this amounts to, in effect, is a decision to give a very
narrow interpretation to Parliament's constitutional power to create a
federal court . Section 101 is seen as an exception to the dominant
scheme of a unitary court system . Now it may be that Parliament was
unwise to give the jurisdiction that it did to the Federal Court, and
that American experience confirmed the undesirability of creating a
separate federal court with wide original jurisdiction-some of it
exclusive-over large areas of federal law . But it may well be
thought that this is essentially a matter for Parliament to decide, and
that once Parliament has spoken clearly it is appropriate for the
Supreme Court to defer to its decision . To limit the jurisdiction that
"Cf. P .W . Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (1977), pp . 81-82 . 91-94,
209-211 . See, however, Consolidated Distilleries Ltd v . Consolidated Exporters
Corporation Ltd, supra, footnote 19, at p . 536, where Anglin C .J .C ., writing for the
majority of the court, squarely rejected the contention advanced in the text that
jurisdiction over third party claims was "necessarily incidental" to the court's
exercise of the jurisdiction properly conferred upon it by Parliament . Perhaps views
have changed in the last fifty years about the proper location of the line dividing what
is necessary from what is highly convenient in matters of procedure .
sa Supra, footnote 14, at p . 206 . Contrast the judgment of Martland J ., at p .
200, where the "startling consequence" of the majority's view confirmed his
dissenting interpretation of s . 101 .
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Parliament can confer upon the Federal Court so narrowly that it
makes even those parts that are clearly valid so practically defective
that drastic legislative reform becomes necessary ,29 seems a
remarkable arrogation of power. No one would contend that the
decision in Fuller produced a convenient result . The question is
whether the court should have interpreted the constitution in such a
way as to avoid it, or whether Parliament had created a problem
which the court was right to leave to Parliament to solve .

If The Bank of Montreal case did not logically compel the
decision in Fuller, the next question is whether there were other
arguments, of at least equal rational cogency, which would have
justified the court in disposing of the litigation in a manner that
would have eased the problems of litigants who resort, whether by
choice or legislative command, to the Federal Court . First, as
Martland J. in his dissenting opinion pointed out, the Crown's right
to recover contribution or indemnity did depend, in part at least,
upon federal law . For the liability of the Crown to the plaintiff in the
principal action, a matter that was disputed in that action and the
third party proceedings, rested upon a question of federal law .3° No
support can be found in McNamara for the proposition that federal
jurisdiction cannot extend to a claim that rests partly upon provincial
law and partly upon federal law.31 The implications of such a view,
considered later in this comment, are so far reaching that it is
difficult to believe that the Supreme Court has espoused it . Whatever
may be the scope of any such ancillary jurisdiction, it ought at least
to exist where the right may otherwise be unenforceable altogether,
or where the inconvenience and burden of requiring the parties to
resort to separate proceedings to litigate the legal questions that
"derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" are such that a
party "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding" . 32 It may be noted that in the United States third-party
29 This appears to have been the meaning of the following statement by Pigeon J .
(ibid., at p. 206) : "If it is considered desirable to be able to take advantage of
provincial legislation on contributory negligence which is not meant to be exercised
outside the courts of the province, the proper solution is to make it possible to have
those rights enforced in the manner contemplated by the general rule of the
constitution of Canada, that is before the superior courts of the province ."
In order to ensure that this will happen, Parliament may have to remove from the
Federal Court much of its exclusive jurisdiction over civil litigation .
30
See supra, footnote 26 .
31
InMcNamara itself, the court (supra, footnote 2, at p. 663) did not regard the
statutory requirement in the Public Works Act, R .S .C ., 1970, P-38, s.16(1), which
required the Minister to take security for the performance of a contract, as providing
an adequate foundation in federal law of the Crown's claim against the surety . See
further footnote 55, infra .
32 United Mineworkers v. Gibbs (1966), 383 U.S . 715, at p. 725 . Cf. Wright
and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, (1969- ), § 1444, where the learned
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claims have been held to fall within the diversity head of federal
jurisdiction in suits in which the plaintiff and defendant were diverse
but where there was no diversity between the third party and the
plaintiff or defendant in the main action ."
A second approach would be to enquire whether the reference to
the liability of the Crown in the Crown Liability Act 34 could not be
interpreted to encompass any rights available to the Crown, whether
by means of a counter-claim by the Crown against the plaintiff or a
claim over against a third party . For both of these in a real sense
relate to the liability of the Crown, in so far as they may reduce the
sum ultimately payable from the public purse in respect of the
"common nucleus of operative fact", from which the Crown's
liability in the main action derives . The "liability" of the Crown
would thus mean its net liability after counter-claims and claims over
against third parties had been taken into account . To allow all such
claims to be disposed of in a single proceeding could also plausibly
be said to conduce to the better administration of a law of Canada,
namely, the Crown Liability Act itself. 34 a Thirdly, the court might
have explored, as it has done in a number of cases which have
examined the constitutionality of the maritime jurisdiction of the
Federal Court, whether references in federal statutes to legal
concepts that depend upon provincial law should not be regarded as
referentially incorporating into federal law the appropriate provisions of provincial law . Thus when the Crown Liability Act speaks
of the liability of the Crown in tort, since there is no independent
body of substantive federal common law, liability is determined by
the law of the relevant province. The substantive law designated by
Parliament for deciding the case will thus satisfy the criterion of a
law of Canada for the purposes of section 101, just as much as the
express enactment in the federal statute of a body of substantive law
would have done.

authors (at p . 221) formulate the task of the courts in such cases as follows : "The
decision ultimately will depend on a weighing of the court's desire to preserve the
integrity of constitutionally based jurisdictional limits against the desire to dispose of
all disputes arising from one set of facts in an action ."
33
For a discussion, see the citation to Wright and Miller, op . cit., ibid. ; a
convenient overview is provided by Laskin and Sharpe, op . cit ., footnote 14, at pp .
286-290 .
" Supra, footnote 7, s . 3(l) .
34a
This thought seems to have been accepted by Laskin C .J .C . in Rhine v . The
Queen and Prytula v . The Queen (reasons for judgment released Dec . 2nd, 1980),
when in upholding federal jurisdiction over claims for the repayment of money paid
,by the Crown under two statutory schemes, he said : "This is all a matter of the
administration of a federal statute and is, therefore, within s . 101 of the British North
America Act ."
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While different views can be held about the desirability of a
dual court system, these should largely be resolved within the
political process . If earlier authority did not compel the decision in
Fuller it is difficult to see the fundamental constitutional values
which justify the infliction of such serious inconveniences upon
litigants. The Supreme Court, after all, .remains a national court of
appeal on questions of both provincial and federal law, and is the
final court of appeal from both the Courts of Appeal in the provinces
and from the Federal Court of Appeal . The same authority appoints
the judges of the superior courts in the provinces as well, of course,
as the judges of the Federal Court.
"Founded upon existing federal law"

The significance of the Fuller case clearly extends beyond the
problems peculiar to litigation involving multiple parties . 34b These
represent but one type of case in which the importance of defining
the relationship between a party's legal rights and a federal law will
arise. Since the Supreme Court of Canada decided Quebec North
Shore and McNamara there has been no shortage of cases in which
the scope, limitations, and ambiguities of this touchstone of federal
jurisdiction have been considered . The case-law demonstrates that
the requirement that the litigation be founded upon existing federal
law is far from self-applying .
Although the Crown Liability Act does not provide an
exhaustive statutory code to govern all aspects of the substantive law
regulating the liability of the Crown, any more than the common law
has developed a comprehensive set of principles defining the legal
obligations of the Crown under a contract to which it is a party, the
Supreme Court in McNamara appears to have established that civil
proceedings against the federal Crown are always founded on federal
law .35 If the constitutional boundaries of federal jurisdiction are to
be determined exclusively by reference to whether the plaintiff's
claim is founded upon a federal law, should it be assumed that in
such a suit the Federal Court may decide any issue raised by the
Crown as a partial or total defence to the plaintiff's claim, even
though the defence is derived from a provincial statute or the general
common law?36 Suppose, for instance, that the Crown pleads that the

34b However, in Rhine and Prytula, ibid., the Supreme Court does not mention
its decision in Fuller, supra, footnote 14 .
3s

See supra, footnote 26.

S. I1 of the Crown Liability Act, supra, footnote 7, may be relevant here . It
provides that the Crown may raise as a defence to anyproceedings brought against it
under the Act, any defence that would be available in litigation betweensubject and
subject. This may well incorporate relevant provincial law, and thus make it "a law
of Canada" for this purpose.
3s
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plaintiff's own carelessness contributed to the injury that he suffered
as a result of the negligent driving of a post office truck by an
employee of the Crown?" What if the Crown seeks to avoid liability
for breach of contract by pleading that it relied upon some
misrepresentation by the plaintiff? Or suppose that the Crown seeks
to reduce the quantum of contractual damages by relying upon the
plaintiff's failure to mitigate its loss, or by asserting a set-off? There
may, of course, be a question about whether a provincial statute
applies, as a matter of interpretation, to the federal Crown . 38 It is
also very doubtful whether a province may impose statutory
liabilities upon the federal Crown . 39 However, a provincial law that
is otherwise within the constitutional competence of a provincial
legislature, may regulate the rights of the federal Crown when it
seeks to avail itself of a right emanating from provincial law ." It is
37 Cf. Murray v . The Queen, [1965] 2 Ex . C . R . 663 ; [1967] S .C.R . 262, where
the Crown's right to recover for the loss of a soldier's injuries inflicted partly as a
result of the defendant's negligence, was held to be governed by provincial
legislation . No question seems to have been raised in the Exchequer Court or the
Supreme Court of Canada about the constitutionality of the jurisdiction of the
Exchequer Court to entertain the Crown's tort claim . In the light of McNamara and
Fuller, however, an interesting point was involved . While the Crown's cause of
action was founded on the common law tort of actio per quod servitium amisit, the
Exchequer Court Act, S .C ., 1952, c . 98, s . 50, provided that for the purpose of claims
by and against the Crown, a member of the armed forces shall be deemed a servant of
the Crown . See Federal Court Act, supra, footnote 6, s . 37 . See also the other cases
cited at footnote 40, infra . Quaere whether this statutory extension of a common law
cause of action would suffice to give a basis in federal law for constitutional
purposes?
38 Whether Crown immunity from the operation of a statute applies to the Crown
in right of another level of government other than that which enacted the legislation is
not altogether clear . However, in The Queen in right of the Province of Alberta v .
Canadian Transport Commission, [1978] 1 S .C .R . 61, Laskin C .J .C . clearly thought
it did . For a further critical discussion of this question, see P . W. Hogg, op . cit . .
footnote 27, pp . 176-177 .
39 See Gauthier v . The King (1918), 56 S .C .R . 176, at pp . 182 (per Fitzpatrick
C .J .), 193-194 (per Anglin J .), although the inconsistent decision of the Privy
Council in Dominion Building Corporation Ltd v . The King, [ 1933] A .C . 533 makes
this a notoriously difficult area of constitutional law . See further Dale Gibson
(1969), 47 Can . Bar Rev . 40, esp . at pp . 51-52 ; P.W . Hogg, op . cit ., ibid ., pp .
178-179 . And see the statement by Laskin C .J .C . in The Queen in right of the
Province of Alberta v . Canadian Transport Commission, ibid ., that "a Provincial
Legislature cannot in the valid exercise of its legislative power, embrace the Crown
in right of Canada in any compulsory regulation . This does not mean that the federal
Crown may not find itself subject to provincial legislation where it seeks to take the
benefit thereof ."
4° Murray's case, supra, footnote 37 (provincial legislation restricting common
law rights of recovery held to bind the federal Crown) ; Toronto Transport
Commission v . The King, [1949] S .C .R . 510, at p . 521 (federal Crown may take the
benefit of provincial contributory negligence legislation so as to reduce but not bar
totally, its damages claim for negligence) . The line may, however, be a fine one : see
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surely impossible to imagine that even the narrowest reading of
section 101 would deprive the Crown of the benefit of any applicable
defences in provincial law, although it may be argued, by analogy
with the reasoning in Fuller's case, that the Crown cannot assert in
the Federal Court a counter-claim that is not based upon federal law,
and which, is capable of supporting an independent. cause of
action. 40a
In the case of a suit brought under the Crown Liability Act,
then, it can plausibly be argued that the statutory reference,to the
"liability" of the Crown must be interpreted to incorporate by
reference the relevant law of the province that would otherwise
govern the dispute . 41 When the facts which give rise to a cause of
action are not all located in one province, and the laws of the
provinces with which they are connected provide different solutions,
then the law by which the "liability" of the Crown is determined,
including any defences that may be available, should be interpreted
to incorporate a reference to an appropriate choice of the rule. Since
the forum of the action is the Federal Court, the question then arises
about the choice of law rule applicable, particularly, ofcourse, if the
provinces involved have different conflict of laws rules . 42 In so far as
a federal statute implicitly authorizes the Federal Court to develop its
own conflict of laws rules in order to dispose of a dispute, the
Murphy's case, infra, footnote 41, where provincial legislation had the effect of
diminishing a defence available to the Crown at common law . Moreover, the effect
upon the federal purse of provincial legislation which imposes a liability upon the
Crown would seem little different from that which diminishes a defence or restricts a
common law right. Different constitutional considerations may apply to a legal
immunity or defence tharis peculiar to the Crown .
Whether there are constitutional limitations upon Parliament's legislative power
to define the civil rights and liabilities of the federal Crown is unclear. In Nykorak v.
Att.-Gen of Canada, [ 19621 S .C .R . 331, federal legislation deeming a member of the
armed forces to be a servant of the Crown was upheld, even though its consequence
was to impose a liability in an actio per quod upon a private individual who, under
provincial law, would not have been so liable . The court relied upon s. 91(7) of the
British North America Act, 1867 . Whether the "peace, order andgood government"
power, or the power in relation to public property and debt in s . 91(IA) would
support the creation of a comprehensive federal code of Crown rights and liabilities
in civil proceedings is far from certain .
'°à Att.-Gen. of Canada v . Rapanos Brothers Ltd (1980), 29 O.R . (2d) 92 (H . C.)
(provincial superior court has jurisdiction to determine whether defendant has a set-off
against the federal Crown, but' not a counter-claim) .
"Cf. The King v. Murphy, [1948] S .C .R . 357, where the suppliant for a
petition of right and a member of the armed forces were both found to have been at
fault. It was held that the Ontario Negligence Act, supra, footnote 15, applied so as
to reduce the suppliant's damages . The Crown was unable to rely upon. the common
law rule that the contributory negligence was a complete bar to his right of recovery .
See also The King v. Lapperiere, [19461 S.C .R . 415.
's Cf. Sivaco Wire and Nail Company v. Tropwood A .G ., [197912 S .C .R . 157,
at p. 166, where Laskin C .J .C . stated that the body
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constitutional requirement of a law of Canada would thus appear to
be satisfied .
In litigation in which the federal Crown is not the defendant, it
may be extremely difficult to determine whether a plaintiff is
founding a claim upon an existing federal law . There are,
nonetheless, clear cases at both extremes of the spectrum . For
example, a claim for damages in which the cause of action is breach
of a duty imposed upon the defendant by a federal statute, is clearly
constitutionally capable of being the subject of federal jurisdiction ."
The decision in Fuller may well add a new dimension to the familiar,
if difficult, problem of determining whether breach of a particular
statutory duty gives rise to a cause of action in a person injured
thereby, or whether the plaintiff must establish a cause of action
based, for instance, on a nominate tort (typically negligence), of
which breach of the statutory duty may be an ingredient . 44 For unless
the plaintiff's claim is founded directly and exclusively upon the
breach of the federal statute there may be significant jurisdictional
difficulties .45
It would seem equally clear that a plaintiff cannot expand
federal jurisdiction beyond its constitutional limits by basing a claim

referentially incorporated by the Federal Court Act, s . 2, "embraces conflict rules
and entitles the Federal Court to find that some foreign law should be applied to the
claim" . He concluded, without elaboration, that the conflicts rules to be applied to
select the appropriate law to determine the dispute, were those of the forum . See also
Santa Marina Shipping Co . S .A . v . Lunham and Moore Ltd, [ 1979] 1 F .C . 25 (T.D .),
United Nations v . Atlantic Seaways Corporation. [1979] 2 F .C . 541 (C . A .) .
1s
See, for example, The Queen v . Rhine. [1979] 2 F .C . 651 (C .A .) aff'd by
S .C .C ., supra, footnote 34a (Crown's claim for repayment of advance paid pursuant to
Prairie Grain Advance Payments Act, R .S .C., 1970, c . P-18, as am ., arose from the
statute that contained a comprehensive code regulating the terms of the advance and the
obligations of the payee) . And see The Queen v . Sovereign Seat Cover Mfg . Ltd (1980),
109 D .L .R . (3d) 494 (Fed . Ct C .A .) . Cf. Canadian Pacific Ltd v . United
Transportation Union, [1979] 1 F .C. 609 (C .A .) (constitutional requirements for
federal jurisdiction satisfied in action for a declaration of the plaintiff's rights under a
collective agreement made binding upon the parties by the Canada Labour Code : relief
refused, because the Code entrusted such questions to the Labour Relations Board) .
44 See generally, Allen M . Linden, Canadian Tort Law (1977), Ch . 7, pp .
285-304 .
45
See, for example, Pacific Western Airlines Ltd v . The Queen, supra, footnote 8,
where it was held that since the Aeronautics Act, R .S .C ., 1970, c . A-3, and the Air
Regulations imposed no duties for breach of which the plaintiffs could recover
damages, the legislation did not provide a basis in federal law for the plaintiff's action
against the defendants other than the Crown . And see The Queen v . Saskatchewan
Wheat Pool, [1980] 1 F .C . 407 (T .D .) rev .'d by Fed . Ct C .A . in judgment rendered on
Nov . 13th, 1980; Haida Helicopters Ltd v . Field Aviation Ltd, [1979] 1 F.C . 143
(T.D .) : McKinlay Transport Ltd v . Goodman, [1979] 1 F .C . 760 (C .A.) . See now
Rhine and Prytula, supra, footnote 34a .
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for a single loss upon two independent causes of action, unless each
is founded upon existing federal law .4s Unsatisfactory as it
undoubtedly is to require a litigant to separate the bases of his legal
rights, whether by causes of action or by parties, and pursue them in
different proceedings, this is precisely what will have to be done if
the Federal Court is chosen as a forum. It is of some comfort to know
that the circumstances in which a plaintiff will be forced to proceed
with a claim for damages in the Federal Court by . virtue of its
exclusive original jurisdiction are few .¢z The most important
instance is when a plaintiff wishes to sue the federal Crown4$ The
result of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada so far
considered in this comment would- appear to require the possible
institution of four suits in order to resolve all the issues of legal
liability that may arise when the Crown is one of several defendants:
(1) the plaintiff must sue the Crown in the Federal Court; (2).
proceedings against other defendants must be instituted in a court in
the appropriate province or abroad ; (3) if held liable, the federal
Crown can only sue for contribution in a provincial court; (4) other
defendants can only claim contribution against the Crown in the
Federal Court. A legal system capable of inflicting outrages. such as
these upon the parties to litigation over commonplace occurrences is.
manifestly functioning at an unacceptably low level . It would surely
take some very special pleading. indeed to convince an unfortunate
16 Intermunicipal Realty and Development Corporation v . Gore_ Mutual
Insurance Co ., [197812 F .C . 691 (T .D.) (claim arising under contract of marine
insurance struck out to the extent that it was based upon negligent misrepresentation
by an alleged agent of the defendant) . See also John A . MacDonald and Railquip
Enterprises Ltd v . Vapor Canada Ltd, [197712 S .C .R . 134 (respondent's claim for
injunctive relief inadmissible in the Federal Court to the extent that it depended upon
violation of invalid federal enactment) .
a7 See, Federal Court Act, supra, footnote 6, ss . 17(1), (3) (specified suits to
which the Crown is party), s . 20 (industrial property) . The Federal Court also has
exclusive original jurisdiction to issue the prerogative orders of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto,- and to grant declarations and injunctions
against federal-boards, commissions or other tribunals, including suits in respect of
such matters instituted against the Attorney General of Canada (s . 18) . The Federal
Court has a limited, but exclusive, jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus (s . 17(5)) . The
jurisdiction of the Federal Court . of Appeal in certain public law matters is also
exclusive (ss 28, 30) .
The grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Court to issue certiorari,
generally leaving in the superior courts in the provinces jurisdiction to issue habeas
corpus in respect of federal agencies, has caused difficulties . See, for example,
Mitchell v . The Queen, [1976] 2 S .C .R. 570, at p . 595 . The Law Reform
Commission of Canada has recommended that the statute should be amended to make
clear that certiorari in aid of habeas corpus remains available in provincial superior
courts : Report No . '14: Judicial Review and the Federal Court (1980), pp . 13-16
(Recommendation 2 .5) .
11 Ibid., s . 17(1) .
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client that such bizarre consequences are dictated by fundamental
constitutional considerations .
The reasoning in Fuller would also seem to exclude from the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court, cases in which a single cause of
action depends upon questions of both federal and provincial law .
The Crown's claim in Fuller itself was of this type . For while the
right to contribution was created by provincial law, one of the issues
upon which success depended was the liability of the Crown to the
plaintiff, a question of federal law . Whether a plaintiff's right is
founded upon existing federal law may often be difficult to
determine . For instance, in one case49 the Crown sued a student to
recover a loan that had not been repaid . The loan had been made by a
bank and guaranteed by the Crown . Federal legislation regulated
many aspects of the transaction, including a statutory right in the
Crown to be subrogated to the bank's rights against a defaulting
borrower.5° The Federal Court upheld federal jurisdiction over this
action, although its reasoning appears dubious .5 t In another case,-52
34a .

"The Queen v . Prytula . [197912 F .C . 516(C . A.), aff'd S .C . C ., supra, footnote

so Canada Student Loans Act, R .S .C ., 1970, c . S-17, and Canada Student Loan
Regulations, SOR/68-345 .
$' In the Trial Division ([1978] 1 F .C . 198), the Crown's application for a
default judgment was dismissed on the ground that the statement of claim rested upon
provincial law, notwithstanding that the Crown's rights were, to a large extent, the
subject of a federal statute . The Court of Appeal did not find it necessary to decide
whether the Crown's legal rights were so closely derived from the statute as to satisfy
the McNamara test of federal jurisdiction .
The Court of Appeal avoided the difficulty of analysing precisely the parts
played by federal and provincial law in the Crown's cause of action . Instead, the
court reasoned that the law governing the contract of loan between a bank and its
customer is excluded from provincial competence by the British North America Act, s .
91(15), and that no post-confederation provincial law of general application could alter
law continued in force by s . 129, the repeal, amendment or alteration of which was within
the exclusive legislative power of Parliament. Thus, all the law applicable to contracts
between a bank and its customers is federal law, whether or not it had been made the
subject of federal legislation .
There are two difficulties with this analysis . First, it seems to assume that
because banking is an exclusive federal matter, the general provincial law of contract
(governing such questions as capacity and the rights of guarantors), cannot apply to
the kind of transaction considered in Prytula . The court further supported its position
by alluding to the possibility that provincial law might otherwise sterilize a federally
regulated activity . This was surely erroneous, and was not supported by the S .C .C .
when it affirmed the decision (see supra, footnote 49) . See P .W . Hogg, op . cit.,
footnote 27, pp . 81-83 . Secondly, in so far as the court appears to equate the term
"laws of Canada" with the scope of federal legislative competence, it is plainly
inconsistent with Quebec North Shore and McNamara . Indeed, the reasoning in these
cases would appear inevitably to support the first criticism .
A more limited version of this thesis was propounded in Associated Metals and
Minerals Corporation v . "The Ship Evie W", [1978] 2 F.C . 710 (C .A .), in which
Footnote 52, see next page .
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the Federal Court assumed jurisdiction over a claim for the loss of
goods that was made by the owner against an air carrier. The
carrier's, liability was derived from a contract of carriage, the terms
of which were regulated by federal statute." Moreover, the court
also held that it had jurisdiction to enter judgment in favour of the
owner's insurers, to,whom the owner's claim has been assigned by
way of subrogation. 51
To what extent do the decisions in McNamara and Fuller
suggest that the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction over cases involving
elements of federal law and of provincial law which have not been
referentially incorporated into federal law by federal legislation? A
broad reading of Fuller would appear to indicate that a plaintiff's
rights only constitutionally fall within federal jurisdiction if they are
exclusively founded upon a law of Canada . It was, after all, quite
clear that in that case the Crown's claim depended equally upon a
federal law (its liability to the plaintiff) and upon provincial law (its
contractual right to indemnity, or its right under the Ontario
Negligence Act to contribution) . Similarly, it might be argued that in
Jackett C.J . stated, correctly, it is submitted, that' the Federal Court has no
jurisdiction when Parliament could enact, but has not done so, special laws in
relation to a class of persons or subject matter; in the absence of such enactments the
rights and obligations of those whose activities fall within an exclusive head of federal
legislative competence are governed by general provincial law . He concluded,
however, that maritime law was different in that it was never part of the general law
of the provinces, and even if it had not been referentially incorporated into federal
law by the Admiralty Act of 1934, it remained, by virtue of s. 129 of the British
North America Act, non-statutory federal law. If this conclusion is correct, it is
difficult to see on what basis the marine insurance legislation enacted by several
provinces could be upheld, or how the general law of a province could apply to a
contract to build a ship in the province . Moreover, if Jackett C.J . were correct it is
difficult to understand why the Supreme Court of Canada in the Tropwood case,
supra, footnote 42, approached so cautiously the constitutional scope of the Federal
Court's jurisdiction in matters of maritime law . The Supreme Court has recently
affirmed the Federal Court of Appeal's judgment, but on the ground that the
jurisdictional test formulated in Tropwood was satisfied : (1980), 31 N.R . 584.

Bensol Customs' Brokers Ltd v. Air Canada, [1979] 2 F.C . 575 (C .A .) .
sa Carriage by Air Act, R
.S .C ., 1970, c. C-14,
54 Cf.
The,Queen v . Montreal Urban Community Transit Commission (an
unreported judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal rendered on March 19th, 1980:
No . A-494,-79), in which the Crown sued in the Federal Court upon its federal
statutory right to be subrogated,to the rights of a Crown employee whom, pursuant to
federal statute, it had compensated for injuries caused by the respondent . Reversing
the Trial Division, the court held that although provincial law governed the liability
of the respondent for the injury sustained by the employee, "the federal statute has
an important part to play in determining the rights of the parties, since without it
appellant would not be able to maintain any right against respondent ."
This argument sounds very like the dissent in Fuller ; but how stands the matter
after Rhine and Prytula?
52
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McNamara the rights of the Crown depended both upon its
contractual capacity (which, even though not in dispute in that case
was fundamental, and, it might be thought, a question of federal
law)," and the general provincial law of contract. If it were indeed
the case that the Federal Court has no jurisdiction whenever the
resolution of a dispute incidentally requires resort to provincial law
"Although the common law never developed a comprehensive body of
principles relating to Crown contracts, fragments of a "public law" of contract do
exist . Thus, the Crown's contractual capacity is subject to a vague and unsatisfactory
inability to fetter by contract the future discharge of the essential functions of the
Executive : Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v . R ., [19211 3 K .B . 500 . This principle
would seem of general application in one form or another, to all public bodies : see de
Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed ., 1980), pp . 317-320 . And
for the effect upon the validity or unenforceability of a contract made by the Crown
without the requisite Parliamentary allocation of funds, see de Smith, Constitutional
and Administrative Law (3rd ed ., 1977), p . 599 .
It should also be noted that the Public Works Act, R .S .C ., 1970, c . 228, P-38
also makes certain provisions in respect of Crown contracts . For instance, s . 16(1)
requires the Minister of Public Works to take reasonable care to ensure that sufficient
security is given to the Crown for due performance by the contractor. In McNamara,
supra, footnote 2, Laskin C .J .C . held, at p . 663, that this did not give a sufficient
basis in federal law to confer jurisdiction upon the Federal Court to entertain a claim
by the Crown to enforce the bond .
S . 17 of the same Act prohibits the payment of money by the Crown until the
contract has been signed by the parties and the requisite security has been given .
Would the Federal Court have jurisdiction to determine a claim by the Crown for the
recovery of money paid in contravention of these provisions? Should the answer
depend upon whether the Crown's theory rested upon a right to recover implicit in the
statute itself, or upon an action for money paid that arose from an ultra vires payment
by the Crown?
Consider also s . 36 of the Public Works Act which requires, subject to certain
exceptions, that contracts be preceded by a public tender. If this restricts the capacity
of the Crown to contract. does it give a federal law basis to the Crown's rights under
those contracts to which the section applies?
But see now Rhine and Prytula, supra, footnote 43, where the Supreme Court
held that federal statutes which regulated the parties' contractual rights and duties in
much more detail did provide a sufficient "shelter" of federal law so as to give the
entire relationship a basis in existing and applicable federal law .
An interesting comparison is provided by Osborn v . Bank of the United States
(1824), 22 U .S . (9 Wheat,) 738, a key case on the interpretation of the phrase in
Article III of the Constitution of the United States that extends the federal judicial
power to "cases arising under . . . the laws of the United States" . On one view of
the Supreme Court's decision, federal jurisdiction over contracts to which the bank
was party depended upon its incorporation under federal law, rather than upon the
possibility that a challenge might be made to its federal authority . For a concise and
penetrating analysis of the principal authorities on the "federal question" doctrine,
see David P . Currie, Federal Jurisdiction (1976), Ch . 3 . This reasoning, however,
would seem of little applicability to Canada, where the reasons for conferring a
separate court exercising federal jurisdiction have little to do with the protection of
federally created rights, but much more with a concern that federal law should be
uniformly and efficiently applied and interpreted .
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which had not been incorporated into federal law, the cases left
within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court over civil litigation
would be few. For instance, in an action brought against the federal
Crown for its vicarious liability for the torts of its servants, it will be
necessary to establish an actionable _tort by the servant, 56 a matter
which will generally be governed by provincial law .57 Moreover,
even in a casè' like Rhine ' 51 in which the court found the statutory
scheme for the payment and recovery of the advances to be
comprehensive, it might well be open to a payee to defend the
Crown's claim for repayment by resort to common law contractual
doctrines such as those relating to mistake, misrepresentation or
capacity .
What test, then,, is available for determining the constitutional
limits of federal jurisdiction in cases in which elements of both
federal and provincial law support the plaintiff's claim? One way in
which the scope of the Supreme Court's decision in McNamara
could be limited was suggested by Le Dain J. in Bensol Customs
Brokers Ltd v . Air Canada .. 19
It should be sufficient in my opinion if the rights andobligations of the parties
are to be determined'to some material extent by federal law. It should not be
necessary that the cause of action be .one that is created by federal law so long
as it is affected by it..

One objection to this formulation is that it lacks that degree of
sharpness and, clarity which jurisdictional rules should possess..
Whether legal rights are to a material extent derived from federal
law, is likely to require judicial elucidation in an unacceptably large
number of cases.. A second difficulty, of course, is whether this test
has survived the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Fuller case where, however,, no reference was made to Bensol
Customs . It would certainly seem that the test proposed by Le Dain J.
is. much closer to the dissenting judgment of Martiand J. than to the
majority opinion. 59 a
ss Crown Liability Act, supra, footnote 7, s. . 4(2) .
sr Thus, s. 17(4)(b) of the Federal Court Act, supra, footnote 6, which confers.
concurrent original jurisdiction upon the Federal Court over proceedings in which
relief is . claimed against a servant or agent of the Crown, has been held to be
unconstitutional insofar as it permits claims for damages in tort which are not
supported by federal laws see, for example Tomossy v. Hammond, [1979] 2 F. C . 232;
Pacific Western ,Aïrlines td v. The Queen, supra, footnote 8. Quaere whether it is
nonetheless arguable that the references in the Crown. Liability Act, supra, footnote
7, s. 3(1)(a) to the liability of the Crown for the torts of Crown servants amount to a
referential incorporation into federal law of the applicable provincial law?
sa supra, footnote 43 .
ss supra, footnote 52, at p. 583 (C .AJ. Italics added. .

ssa See now, however Rhine andPrytula, supra, footnotes 34a and 43, where the
judgment of Laskin C.J .C . may indicate that the Supreme Court is willing to move
towards a position similar to that .adopted by Le Dain J.
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The facts of Bensol Customs provide a useful context in which
to examine the precise scope of the decision in Fuller . The plaintiffs
were the owner of goods and their insurers who claimed as subrogees
of the owner's rights against the carrier for the loss of the goods . The
owner's statement of claim alleged that the carrier was liable by
virtue of the Carriage by Air Act,s° and in tort . The insurers, who
were the only active plaintiffs, claimed that they were assignees by
subrogation of whatever rights the owner had against the carrier. The
litigation was instituted in the Federal Court pursuant to section 23 of
the Federal Court Act which gives the court concurrent jurisdiction
in respect of claims made "under an Act of the Parliament of Canada
or otherwise in relation to any matter coming within . . . aeronautics
and works and undertakings . . . extending beyond the limits of a
province . 1161 Pratte J . (with whom Hyde D.J . concurred) confined
his judgment to the interpretation of section 23, and held that the
owner's claim in contract was made "under" the Carriage by Air
Act ,62 but that its claim in tort was not founded upon a federal law
and should, therefore, be dismissed .63 As regards the insurer's
claim, he held that this, too, fell within section 23 since it was made,
in part at least, under a federal statute . Le Dain J . agreed with the
reasons for decision given by Pratte J ., and proceeded to consider, in
the terms quoted above, the constitutionality of the assumption of
jurisdiction in the light of McNamara .
Following the decision in Fuller, however, the correctness of
Le Dain J .'s approach looks highly suspect .63a I n particular, the fact
that an essential element in the insurer's claim was the federal law
question of the carrier's liability to the owner would appear an
so Supra, footnote 53 . This Act gives effect to the Warsaw Convention ; the most
material provisions for the purposes of this litigation seemed to be that the carrier is
liable for loss unless it proves that it was not at fault, and that conditions relieving the
carrier of its liability under the Convention are void .
s' The goods were allegedly lost while being carried between London and
Montreal .
62
The fact that the owner's cause of action was for breach of contract, rather
than for breach of statutory duty, was not regarded by Pratte J . as fatal to federal
jurisdiction . Since no statement of defence had been put in by the defendants, it is
difficult to tell to what extent the issues in dispute were likely to turn upon the
statutory provisions . Nor does the Convention comprehensively determine each and
every condition that may be contained in an air waybill (see [ 19791 1 F . C . 167, at pp .
177-178) .
63 Dismissal of this part of the statement of claim did not prejudice the court's
jurisdiction to determine that part which was within the jurisdiction . Assuming that
the liability in tort survives the Warsaw Convention, the owners of the goods would
have to pursue any additional rights that they might have in tort in a provincial court .
This is yet another instance of the inconveniences of the dual court system now
operating in Canada .
63a
But see supra, footnote 59a .
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inadequate basis upon which to rest federal jurisdiction . If the
Crown's right to contribution in Fuller was not founded on federal
law (albeit that the Crown's liability to the plaintiff was a matter of
federal law, and was a condition precedent to the right asserted), it is
difficult to see why the insurer's claim was founded on federal law
(albeit that whether there were any rights upon which the subrogation
could operate depended upon federal law) . As for the rights of the
owner of the goods, since these derived from contract (albeit that
federal law regulated the terms of the contract), it is not at all clear
that they would now be held to be based upon federal law .
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Supreme Court of
Canada in Fuller has held that for a claim to be "founded on federal
law", the plaintiff's cause of action must be for breach of a federal
statutory duty. The only exception so far admitted is that the liability
of the federal Crown always rests upon federal law . Thus, the reason
why the Crown lost in Fuller was because its cause of action arose
under provincial law. If this is the test, it at least has the merit of
some certainty . 64 It is, however, quite a long way removed from the
apparently wider wording of section 101 which .speaks, it will be
recalled, of "the better administration of the laws of Canada" . It is
also an interpretation that evidently did not occur to the Supreme
Court when it had earlier decided a number of cases in which the
federal Crown had sued in the Exchequer Court for the loss of the
services of a member of the armed forces who had been injured by
the negligence of the defendant ." Now it would have to be said that
the Crown's cause of action was the ordinary law of tort, and the fact
that the injured person is deemed by federal legislation to be a
6° This was the approach recently taken by the Federal Court of Appeal in The
Queen v . Sovereign Seat Cover Mfg Ltd, supra, footnote 43, in which the court
dismissed a motion by the defendants to strike out as beyond the jurisdiction of the
Federal Court an action by the Crown to recover a development incentive grant. In
the Trial Division the motion had been granted because "the payment of the
incentive had been made under the terms of a contract between the parties, a contract
constituted by the acceptance by the defendants of a written offer made to them by the
plaintiff." The Federal Court of Appeal, however, interpreted the terms of the
relevant legislation under which the payment was made, as not merely defining the
parties' contractual rights, but as constituting the very legal rights, upon the breach
of which the Crown based its cause of action .

The judgments of the Supreme Court in Rhine and Prytula, supra, footnotes 43
and 49 are equivocal on the question of whether the Crown must show that breach of
a federal statute gives rise to a statutory cause of action or that a federal statute
closely regulates the parties' contractual rights and duties .
6s See, for example, The King v . Richardson, [1948] S .C .R . 57 ; Murray v . The
Queen, supra, footnote 37 . Nor was any constitutional objection made to the
common law causes of action brought by the Crown in the Exchequer Court in
Toronto Transport Commission v . The King, supra, footnote 39, and Gartland
Steamship Co . v. The Queen, [1960] S.C .R . 315.
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servant of the Crown would be as inadequate a basis for federal
jurisdiction as was the liability of the Crown to the plaintiff in
Fuller .
One other possible way of defining the relationship between a
plaintiff's rights and federal law that is necessary to found federal
jurisdiction was suggested in The Queen v. Prytula . ss In that case,
the Crown sued a student borrower for the repayment of a loan upon
which the respondent had defaulted . The relevant federal legislation
provided that when a bank made a "guaranteed student loan" (as
statutorily defined), the Crown was liable to pay to the bank interest
on the loan and to compensate the lending bank for any loss that it
suffered on defaults' The Act also empowered the Governor in
Council to make regulations concerning "the subrogation of Her
Majesty to the rights of a bank with respect to a guaranteed student
loan" . 6 $ For reasons already explained ,69 the Federal Court of
Appeal finessed the issue of whether the Crown's claim was
"founded" on the statute within the meaning of the decision in
McNamara . Nonetheless, Heald J. formulated as follows the
question that would have been relevant if the court had had to decide
it: 70
. . . unless the law impliedly creates a new statutory liability by the borrower
to Her Majesty in an amount to be determined by reference to the loan contract,
as opposed to merely conferring on the Crown the rights of the bank under the
contract of loan, it is open to question whether the statute can be said to be the
law that is being administered by a court when it is adjudicating on the claim by
Her Majesty against the borrower from the Bank .

If the interpretation of the statute revealed that the first basis of
the Crown's rights was correct, would this make the claim one that
was "founded on existing federal law" as this criterion must be
understood in the light of Fuller? If by a "new" statutory liability,
what is meant is that had the statute not been enacted, the respondent
could not have been sued by the Crown, it would seem that this
would be insufficient . For in Fuller the Crown had been sued by the
plaintiff in tort, and had the Crown Liability Act not been in force, it
could not have been held liable . Nonetheless, the "new" liability
created by that Act was an inadequate basis in federal law upon
which to bring its claim for contribution within federal jurisdiction .

ss Supra, footnote 49 .
c' Canada Students Loans Act, supra, footnote 50 .
68 Ibid ., s . 13(j) . This provision gives a firmer base in federal law for the
Crown's rights than the insurer's rights in Bensol Customs, supra, footnote 52 .
ss See supra, footnote 51 .
10 Supra, footnote 49, at pp . 523-524 .
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The analysis suggested earlier would indicate that the proper
question is whether the Crown's cause of action arises directly from
a breach of statutory duty, rather than from the common law, albeit
that the extent of the Crown's rights may be affected by relevant
federal legislation ." Does the Student Loans Act so clearly and
comprehensively define the rights and obligations of the parties that
it can fairly be said to create a statutory cause of action? The scheme
certainly does more than to authorize the Crown to give guarantees
for loans made in specified circumstances . Nonetheless, the Crown's
cause of action against the defaulting borrower would seem to be the
common money count for the repayment of money paid to the
borrower . The relevance of the legislation would then be to show
either that the guarantee was not given voluntarily by the Crown, or
that the forms prescribed by it and signed by the borrower constituted
a "request" for the guarantee . This would defeat any argument that
the Crown's payment to the bank constituted the "officious"
conferral of a benefit upon the borrower such as will often defeat a
restitutionary action ."
There is always an air of unreality about interpreting legislation
to divine the legislature's "intention" on a matter about which it had
clearly never thought. To require courts to perform this exercise in
an area of notorious difficulty in order to apply a constitutional
standard of jurisdiction seems little short of bizarre. Indeed, if the
Supreme Court in Fuller has defined the permissible scope of federal
jurisdiction by reference to the nature of the plaintiff's cause of
action, it may have given an unwelcome lease of life to some of the
lost arts of common law pleading . However, in the reasons for
judgment in Rhine and Prytula-released as this comment was being
submitted to the Review-the Supreme Court appears to have started
to dig itself out of the hole created by Fuller . For despite the
statement by Laskin C.J .C . that the federal statutes in those cases
provided for the repayment of the money which the Crown was suing
to recover, other remarks suggest that federal jurisdiction may
extend beyond causes of action founded on a federal law. In
particular, he emphasized the "overall scheme" created by the
legislation, and noted that despite the "undertaking or contractual
consequence" of the application of the statutes, "at every turn the
Act has its impact on the undertaking so as to make it proper to say
that there is here existing and valid federal law to govern the
'i Nor should it be critical whether the statute increased beyond that recoverable
at common law the quantum of any amount that the Crown could claim from
the defaulting borrower. And see supra, footnote 64 .
's See Owen v. Tate, [1976] Q. B. 706. See further, Goff and Jones, The Law of
Restitution (2nd ed ., 1978), Ch . 14 .
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transaction" . Since Fuller was not mentioned by the court, one can
only speculate as to why in that case the Crown Liability Act had
insufficient impact to support federal jurisdiction over the contribution claim .
When is law 'federal law" ?
If the decision in Fuller requires so close a relationship between
legal rights and a federal law as has been suggested, then a more
fruitful method of avoiding the inconvenient results described above
may be to focus upon the question of whether any relevant federal
legislation can be interpreted as incorporating into federal law the
substantive provincial law by which the parties' legal relationship
would otherwise be governed .
Of course, it will not always be easy to predict when the courts
will interpret a federal statute to include a referential incorporation
of provincial law . On the one hand, it seems clear that when the
federal Crown is sued in tort, in the absence of some specific federal
statute, the liability is determined by the provincial law that would
have applied had the litigation been between subject and subject . The
reference in the Crown Liability Act to the Crown's liability in tort is
taken to refer to the applicable provincial law, and not to some
substantive federal law of tort. On the other hand, it has been equally
clear since McNamara, that references in the Federal Court Act to
suits brought by the Crown do not incorporate wholesale into federal
law, the relevant provincial law . Nor do they authorize the Federal
Court to develop a substantive body of judge-made federal common
law upon which federal jurisdiction could operate .
The incorporation by reference doctrine appears to have been
developed most effectively on the admiralty side of the Federal
Court's jurisdiction . In particular, in Sivaco Wire and Nail Company
v . Tropwood A .G . ' 73 the Supreme Court held that the Federal Court
Act referentially incorporates certain aspects of maritime and
admiralty law . Thus, the definition in section 2 of that Act of
"Canadian maritime law" was said to include the section of the
Admiralty Act of 1891'4 which, even though it was repealed before
the Federal Court Act was enacted, 75 provided that "all persons shall
have such rights and remedies in all matters" relating to admiralty
that were enforceable by virtue of the British Colonial Courts of
Admiralty Act, 1890 . Jurisdiction to determine disputes arising from
this substantive body of law was conferred upon the Exchequer
Court .
'a Supra. footnote 42 .

'4 S.C ., 1891, c . 29, s . 4 .
's Admiralty Act, S .C ., 1934, c . 31 .
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After the Chief Justice in the Tropwood" case had expressly left
open the question of whether an item of the Federal Court's
admiralty jurisdiction which had not been covered by the 1891 Act
was for jurisdictional purposes "a law of Canada", it is surprising to
read how easily the Supreme Court disposed of the issue in Antares
Shipping Corporation v . The Ship "Capricorn" ." The court held
that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain an action forthe
specific performance of a contract of sale of a ship, on the ground
that the provision of the Federal Court Act dealing with claims to
title, possession or ownership of a ship was an existing federal law
upon which the court's jurisdiction could operate .7a The single
judgment, delivered by Ritchie J., is not, however, as explicit as it
might have been about the basis of this conclusion. His Lordship
appears to have regarded the grants of jurisdiction conferred upon
the Federal Court by section 22 and 44 of the Federal Court Act as
sufficient in themselves . 79 It is true that the following statement in
Tropwood" might appear to support Ritchie J's view:

"What is important to notice is that the heads of jurisdiction specified in s.
22(2) are nourished, so far as applicable law is concerned, by the ambit of
Canadian maritime law or any other existing law of Canada relating to any
matter coming within the class of navigation and shipping". .

However, it is clear from the rest of the judgment that the court did
not decide that each element of the definition of "Canadian maritime
law" in section 2 incorporated a substantive body of law on which

°s Sivaco Wire and Nail Co . v. Tropwood A.G ., supra, footnote 42, at pp .
162-163, where Laskin, C.J .C . inclined to the, view that the Admiralty Act, 1934,
ibid ., could provide a statutory foundation for maritime law .
" (1980), 30 N.R . 104. Although reasons for judgment in Antares and Fuller
were given within eight days of each other, the cases pass, as it were, like ships in the
night .
78 In the Federal Court of Appeal, [1978] 2 F.C . 834, Le Dain J., relying upon a
line of decisions in the United States, had held that actions for the specific
performance of a contract of such type did not fall within s. 22 of the Federal Court Act,

supra, footnote 6.
. the judgment of the Trial Division in Antares, [1973] F.C . 955;
"Cf
Associated Metals andMineral Corporation v. The Ship "Evie W", .supra, footnote
51 ; Benson Bros . Shipbuilding Co . (1960) Ltd v. Mark Fishing Co Ltd (1978), 89
D.L.R . (3d) 527 (Fed . Ct C.A .) ; Davie Shipbuilding Ltd v. The Queen, supra,
footnote 19 ; The Queen v. Canadian Vickers Ltd (1979), 28 N.R . 486 (Fed . Ct
C.A .) . See also In the matter of a Reference as to the Legislative Competence of
Parliament of Canada to Enact Bill No . 9, Entitled "An Act to . Amend the Supreme
Court Act", [1940] S .C .R . 49, at pp . 108-109, where Kerwin J. regarded the power
of Parliament to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon the Exchequer Court as being
co-extensive with its legislative competence under s. 91(10) . In the light of Quebec
North Shore and McNamara, the Supreme Court's difficulty now is to explain why
admiralty law is "federal law" whereas other non-statutory law relating to federal
subject-matter generally is not.
so Supra, footnote 42, at p. 161 .
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the jurisdiction conferred by section 22 operated . The holding was
confined to a finding that section 2 included a reference to the
Canadian Admiralty Act, 1891 and that this Act incorporates certain
substantive admiralty law into the law of Canada . In Antares, the
Supreme Court did not specifically consider whether the plaintiff's
claim was governed by a law that fell within the jurisdiction of the
English Court of Admiralty and which could have been referentially
incorporated by the Admiralty Act, 1891, or, if it did not, whether
the Admiralty Act, 1934 incorporated it.
The true basis of the court's judgment in Antares is thus
obscure, although a broad reading of the decision might indicate that
the references to admiralty jurisdiction and maritime matters in the
Federal Court Act are to be regarded as incorporating English
admiralty law, as amended by Canadian statutes, into federal law ."'
Thus, the only limits upon the Federal Court's jurisdiction are those
contained in the relevant grant of legislative competence by the
British North America Act, 1867, section 91(10), over shipping and
navigation, and by the statutory definitions ofjurisdiction contained
in the Federal Court Act itself.
That this is indeed the position appears to have been confirmed
by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Associated Metals
and Minerals Corp . v. The Ship "Evie W" sz in which the court
relied upon the broad statement quoted above from the judgment of
Laskin C.J .C. in Tropwood. Antares and Associated Metals provide
a sharp contrast with the narrow approach adopted by the Supreme
Court to other heads of the Federal Court's jurisdiction . No less
remarkable is the terseness with which the Supreme Court has dealt
with the fundamental question of the extent to which the provisions
of the Federal Court Act, other than the narrow question already
decided in Tropwood, are to be interpreted as referentially embodying substantive law in addition to conferring jurisdiction .
Possible reforms
The first ten years of the Federal Court's existence have
produced a remarkably large number of jurisdictional difficulties .
This comment has concentrated on the most important of those
created by the limited constitutional power of Parliament to confer
jurisdiction upon a federal court . The recent report of the Law
Reform Commission" details the jurisdictional difficulties that have
$ 1 Until its repeal as part of Canadian law in 1934, the Colonial Courts of
Admiralty Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict ., c . 27 (U .K.), s . 3, provided an alternative
source of Parliament's power to confer admiralty jurisdiction upon a court.
82 (1980), 31 N .R . 584 .
83 Report No . 14, op . cit ., footnote 47, pp . 11-20 .
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arisen from the interpretation of the statutory terms which define the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court over federal public authorities, a
jurisdiction formerly exercised by the courts in the provinces. The
application and the interpretation of sections 18 and 28 of the Federal
Court Act which alhicate jurisdiction between the Trial Division of
the Court of Appeal have also attracted litigation on a scale that
could scarcely have been anticipated when the statute was passed .

Amidst this avalanche of jurisdictional litigation, the suggestion
that a dual court system for Canada is misconceived has obvious
attractions . It is to be hoped that the Government will undertake a
comprehensive assessment of the troubles that have beset the Federal
Court, and attempt a dispassionate evaluation of the record overall
rather than respond in piecemeal fashion to particular difficulties .
However, the combined effect of Quebec North Shore, McNamara
and Fuller may well have caused such serious problems for parties to
litigation in which the federal Government is one of several
defendants, that an immediate amendment to the Act to make the
whole of the Federal Court's section 17 jurisdiction concurrent
would seem justifiable . The terms of section 17 would- seem clearly
to preclude reform by the administrative device of the federal
Crown's attorning to the jurisdiction of a provincial superior court.
If, on the other hand, Parliament's considered view is that there
is merit in maintaining the wide original jurisdiction of the Federal
Court, amending legislation will be needed in order to give a base in
federal law to the rights upon which it can constitutionally
adjudicate . A Federal Court (Amendment) Bill might be drafted to
achieve these aims by the wholesale incorporation into federal law of
provincial laws in so far as -their subject matter falls within federal
legislative competence .84

Clause 1
(1) Whenever the legal rights and liabilities of parties to litigation over which
the Federal Court has been granted jurisdiction by virtue of any provision
of the Federal Court Act or of any other statute enacted by the Parliament of
Canada are not founded upon an existing federal statute or other federal
law, it is hereby provided that the said rights and liabilities shall be
determined in accordance with:
(a) the provisions of any applicable provincial statute to the extent that its
subject-matter falls within the legislative competence of the Parliament
of Canada, and
(b,) in the absence of any such applicable provincial statute, and to the
extent that it is within the legislative competence of the Parliament of
Canada to modify or repeal it, the common law.

e' That this is a constitutionally permissible technique is amply supported.b y the
authorities assembled by Laskin and Sharpe, op . cit., footnote 14, in notes 98 and
118 . For a contrary view, though, see Kerr, Constitutional Limitations on the
Admiralty Jurisdiction of the Federal Court (1979), 5 Dal. L.J . 768, at p. 577 .
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(2) To the extent that it is necessary for the determination of the legal rights

and liabilities of parties to litigation over which the Federal Court has
jurisdiction to resort to the law of more than one Province or to the law of a
foreign country, the said rights and liabilities shall be determined in
accordance with the laws of that legal system which the common law
relating to the conflict of laws makes applicable .
Clause 2
Any law which, pursuant to Clause 1, is applicable to a dispute over which the
Federal Court has been granted jurisdiction is hereby incorporated into federal
law and adopted as a law of Canada .
Clause 3
For the purpose of this Act,
(1) "Statute" includes any law made under the authority of a statute .
(2) "Common Law" in clause l(1)(b) includes the common law rules relating
to the conflict of laws .

Conclusions

This comment has examined the role played by the Supreme
Court in producing a state of affairs which has been judicially
described as lamentable . 85 If the learned judge had chosen the word
scandalous, he could surely not have been criticized for resorting to
melodramatic hyperbole . Why then, has the court decided to
interpret section 101 in a way that results in such obvious
inconvenience and injustice to litigants? Certainly neither previous
authority nor the specific language in the constitution was logically
compelling . The answer must be that the court has attached a high
priority to the strategic goal of maintaining the integrity of the
unitary court system which it saw embodied in the overall scheme for
the allocation of the judicial power in the British North America Act,
1867 . It has chosen to pursue this value at the expense of the tactical
objective of interpreting the constitution in a way which would
smooth the administration of justice in the interests of those who
choose or are forced to litigate in the Federal Court. It thus construed
in a very narrow fashion the one exception to the unitary court
system which the constitution very clearly contains .
Precisely why the court has not reacted in similar vein to the
maritime jurisdiction conferred by Parliament upon the Federal
Court is not easy to say . A list of reasons to account for this attitude
might include the long historical association of the Exchequer Court
with admiralty law, the strong reasons of expediency for ensuring the
uniform development and application of the law, and its enforcement
in a single court with powers to deal with its special procedural and
remedial aspects, the international dimensions of the law relating to
as By Collier J . in Pacific Western Airlines Ltd v . The Queen, supra,
footnote 3 .
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ships and shipping, and the comparatively slight provincial interest
in this area of the administration of justice .
In so far as the Supreme Court has decided to prefer the
constitutional value of a unitary court .system to the more immediate
consideration of doing justice to particular litigants, it has not
necessarily exceeded its proper role . But there is another constitutional interest which the court ought also to take carefully into
account . This is that the legislative judgments of Parliament on
matters of policy are entitled to judicial respect . Thus if Parliament
has purported to exercise its constitutional authority on a subject
assigned to it by the British North America Act, then the court
should interpret the scope of the grant of power in a way which
enables Parliament's policy to be effective . The most telling
criticism of the decision in Fuller is that even though required
neither by the text of the constitution nor by previous authority, the
court has interpreted Parliament's powers so narrowly that it has
rendered admittedly unimpeachable provisions of the Federal Court
Act seriously defective .
The court has in effect forced the hand of Parliament to attempt
to salvage what it will from the wreckage. It is to be hoped that the
task of producing new legislation is regarded as important enough to
warrant an expeditious and thorough response, and that the often
painful experiences of the first ten years of the Federal Court will
ultimately be turned to good account.
J. 1VI: EVANS*

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-DIVISION OF POWERS-

ACT.-The Hauser case' deals with the
division of jurisdiction in criminal law between the federal and
provincial governments . In our federal system, legislative and
executive authority resides in both provincial and federal governments . These powers in relation to some matters are the. exclusive
jurisdiction of either one or the other government. In criminal law
matters, both governments share both legislative and executive
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